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The growing adoption of virtual currency-related business activities has posed 
increasing challenges to law enforcement. Virtual currency offers a novel solution for 
both individuals and organisations to engage in money laundering activities and 
bypass the detection of law enforcement. Therefore, in the European context, the 
authority continuously introduces stricter regulations to the virtual currency service 
providers, creating pressure on the companies to meet the necessary legal 
requirements to avoid the reputational risk and ensure the existence of the business.  
The objective of this thesis is to combine the literature and legislative texts related to 
virtual currency to create an AML internal process for a case company in the Finnish 
context. A qualitative approach featuring the case study was used because it is the 
most suitable approach to identify the business challenge and provide a solution to 
address the European regulation as transposed into law in Finland. 
The outcome is the internal AML process proposal which was depicted as a swim 
lane chart detailing the company’s departments and communication flow. The result 
would ensure agile AML execution and make the compliance process aligned with 
the company’s strategy. The proposal would provide a preliminary means for the 
companies in constructing their AML program while complying to the stricter AML 
regulations. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Thesis’ background and objectives 
The activity of masking the origin of money obtained from criminal activities is indeed an 
old practice. This activity can be traced back to the 1920s when mafia families in the 
United States actively engaged in opening business “fronts” to launder their financial 
benefits derived from illegally lucrative businesses such as human trafficking, drugs, and 
arms (Levi & Reuter, 2006). The rapid globalisation process took place only after the 
second half of the 20th century has increased levels of transnational investment and 
technological transition across countries. As a result, criminal groups and terrorist 
organisations can now quickly move funds from one country to another while taking 
advantage of the discrepancy in the legislation of different states and territories.  
A common dilemma is that, when criminals want to spend their illegally-earned money, 
this could potentially draw the attention of tax auditors or law enforcement authorities. 
As new financial instruments emerge into the global market, money launderers regularly 
adapt how and where they could convert and transfer the funds into other assets such 
as virtual currency (“VC”) to circumvent the regulations enacted by the authority to 
identify and disrupt illegal activities. From the regulatory standpoint, the growing adoption 
of VC-related business activities have posed increasing challenges to not only the 
traditional banking system but also law enforcement, especially its compliance 
department and financial task force (Lastra & Allen, 2018) 
VC asset offers a novel solution for both individuals and organisations engaging in 
criminal activities. According to expert’s estimation, the total market capitalisation of VC 
once exceeded USD 600 billion during the bull run in the fourth quarter of 2017 and now 
being valued at USD 200 billion (CoinMarketCap, 2020). This growth has led to VCs and 
Initital Coin Offering (“ICOs”) being an essential form of personal asset and VC-related 
businesses. These businesses consist of both direct business such as VC exchange or 
wallet custodian service provider and those supplementary business, including but not 
limited to, gaming, computing, and banking. Typically, VC is easily exploited by criminals 
amassing significant wealth from committing crimes such as human trafficking, Ponzi 
scheme, extortion, drug ring, and corruption. Illegal goods and services are now 
transferred quickly and largely anonymously on the so-called “dark-web” in exchange for 
VC. Chainanalysis, an industry leader in blockchain forensics, accounted that criminals 
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laundered $2.8 billion in Bitcoin to exchanges, up from $1 billion compared to 2018 
(Robert, 2020). As VC offer greater obscurity than the traditional fiat currencies (such as 
EUR, USD, JPY), it is more challenging for the authority to connect the dots in 
investigating the crime proceeds. The hardest part is to link the laundered VC and its 
owner. AML risk presents severe threat to the integrity of the economy because it has 
effects on forming interest groups in specific sectors or industries, which in turns might 
corrupt large groups of people in the society. 
As these engagements have continuously gained momentum, regulators and financial 
institutions are becoming more aware of the fact that decentralisation provides an ever- 
more powerful new tool for criminals and other sanctions-evaders to transfer or store 
illegal funds, and, as a result, create unique challenges in terms of money laundering 
risks to law enforcement. 
As an attempt to address the problem, the author decided to write the Bachelor’s thesis 
on the topic of " Applying the Anti-Money Laundering regulations of virtual currency to 
build an effective internal control process: Case study Finland". The research paper has 
three main objectives: 
1. To display the current state of global AML regulation of virtual currency and its 
practical application in Finland;  
2. To explore the money laundering activities in the virtual currency field;  
3. To feature a case study and develop a comprehensive reference model in 
response to the AML risks. 
1.2 Thesis’ scope and structure 
As a literature-based thesis, the scope is to apply the theoretical knowledge to develop 
an AML internal process for a case company in the Finnish context. This model shall 
identify the critical European legal requirements as transposed into practice in Finland.   
This thesis consists of five main parts: introduction, literature review, analytical 
framework and methodology, and discussion on the findings.  
The author organises this paper as follow: Chapter 1 outlines the thesis background, its 
significance, and objectives, which is helpful for readers to have a preliminary 
understanding of the thesis topic. Chapter 2 details the literature review, which consists 
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of three sub-sections providing the theoretical knowledge of the research topic. Section 
2.1 would introduce the core definitions of VC and explain the growing importance of VC 
in today’s world. Section 2.2 displays the sophisticated money laundering process 
conducted by the criminals, which leads to the analysis of the legal and regulatory 
challenges globally. This section also presents the existing AML legal & regulatory 
approach regarding virtual currency in both European and Finnish context. Section 2.3 
detailed the potential AML risks from the regulatory standpoint, which are essential to 
construct an efficient AML internal process for the case company. Chapter 3 discusses 
the research methodology, data collection methods and data analysis of the study, which 
give insights to the case study and allow readers to develop their critical assessment of 
the study’s reliability and validity. Chapter 4 encompasses the case study analysis, which 
consists of three sub-sections. The first sub-section is the current state analysis, which 
the author evaluates the current AML practice of the case company. Then, the author 
presents the AML reference model after identifying the critical AML challenges related to 
the existing practice. Afterwards, the author discusses the validation results of the AML 
reference model. The final Chapter 5 presents the summary and the assessment of the 
reliability and validity of the thesis.  
2 Literature review 
2.1 The strategic role of virtual currency in the global context 
The virtual currency has undoubtedly gained popularity among the global financial 
market as a technological-advanced alternative for the traditional fiat currency. In less 
than a decade, virtual currency has gone from being a case of curiosity to the global 
phenomenon (Dabrowski & Janikowski, 2018). In order to comprehend the importance 
of AML risk controls in the virtual currency field, it is critical to understand fully what virtual 
currency is and how it is relevant to today’s world.  
2.1.1 Virtual Currency: Understanding the essence 
The definition of the virtual currency tends to vary depending on the context. Virtual 
currency is defined as a digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and 
functions as (1) a medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store 
of value but does not have legal tender status (FATF, 2014). Meanwhile, the European 
Central Bank explained virtual currency to be a type of unregulated, digital money, which 
4 
  
is issued and usually controlled by its developers and used and accepted among the 
members of a specific virtual community (ECB, 2012). According to Dibrova (2016), the 
definition provided by the ECB was too broad, which was revised again in 2015. In the 
new definition, the word “money” was removed because of the transaction volume of 
virtual currencies was too insignificant compared to other well-established payment 
solutions such as Visa or Mastercard. At the same time, the low acceptance rate of virtual 
currencies among online shops also contributed to the change in definition (ECB, 2015). 
Up until now, there is still no international agreement on how “virtual currency” should be 
defined, but people might find some overlapping terms such as “crypto-asset”, “crypto-
token”, and “cryptocurrency” (ECB, 2019). The taxonomy of virtual currencies is detailed 
in the following figure:  
 
Figure 1. Taxonomy of Virtual Currencies, IMF (2016) 
Dibrova (2016) argued that the development of definitions of virtual currencies in the 
European Union, including the continuation of finalised legislative base formation, had 
not been finalised. As a result, some people might find confusion in distinguishing VC 
from digital currency. Based on the IMF’s staff note, virtual currencies fall within a 
broader category of digital currencies (IMF, 2016). However, what sets them apart is that 
virtual currencies are not denominated in fiat currency and have their unit of account. For 
example, although electronic money (e-money) belongs to the digital currencies 
category, it is not classified as virtual currencies because it does not possess the legal 
status of currency or money. This confusion in definitions was further emphasised in the 
Fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (AMLD5) enacted by the European Parliament 
and of the Council in 2018 (European Union, 2018).  
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Virtual currencies consist of both centralised and decentralised currencies. The main 
difference between these two types is that decentralised VC does not need an 
administrator or trusted third-party ledger, but it can be exchanged for fiat currency. 
Meanwhile, both convertible and non-convertible centralised virtual currencies such as 
Web money or game coins require supervisory authority from an administrator. Although 
there is a discrepancy in how different organisations define what VC is, it is commonly 
agreed that VC is not classified as a financial instrument. Therefore, it does not represent 
financial liability or equity on any identifiable entity.  
Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT)  
In the wake of the continuous trend of banking disintermediation, the emergence of VC 
recently is further accelerated by a computing decentralisation mechanism called 
distributed ledger technology (DLT) (World Bank, 2017). Being the essence of virtual 
currencies, DLT is a novel and fast-evolving protocol which allows users to modify the 
records in a commonly-shared database (i.e. ledger) in a synchronised way, without 
needing to engage in a centralised system imposing either standards or processes (ECB, 
2016). DLT has been linked to virtual currencies since its early days because DLT was 
invented as the technological foundation to the cryptocurrency Bitcoin. In 2008, Satoshi 
Nakamoto, an unidentified person using a pseudonym, published a landmark paper 
called “Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System”, which suggested a method of 
moving the funds in the form of Bitcoin based on the peer-to-peer (P2P) mechanism 
(Nakamoto, 2008). Although the terminology that Satoshi used in his paper is called 
“blockchain”, the idea of re-organising the records of assets in a P2P manner 
subsequently led to the new broader term “distributed ledger technology” (World Bank, 
2017).  
In the traditional banking system, the central bank facilitates the payment transactions 
by transferring the money from one account to another with a master ledger system. 
Therefore, the central banks hold the responsibility to validate the transaction on their 
central ledgers to ensure the accuracy of the data and safeguard them from being 
tampered by criminals. This standard transactional model is described on the right side 
of Figure 2.  
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Figure 2. The mechanism of a blockchain-based DLT vs the centralised banking system. IMF 
(2016) 
 
Meanwhile, the mechanism on the left side of Figure 2 depicts how the DLT-based 
infrastructure store, record, and exchange information digitally across different 
counterparties without the control of any centralise record-keeper. At the same time, the 
pre-defined algorithmic validation method of this mechanism guarantees there is no 
“double-spend”. In plain words, it merely means that if a member A sent €1000 value of 
Bitcoin to member B, A cannot send that €1000 again to member C because other 
members would not verify the node containing that information. This distinctive feature 
of DLT led many industry experts to believe that DLT would revolutionise certain areas 
within the financial sector, especially in regulatory compliance. A case study by 
Accenture concluded that major investment banks could reduce the existing compliance 
cost by 30% to 50% if they can adequately combine DLT into the banking system 
(Accenture, 2017). As a result, in Dariusz Szostek’s view (2019:142), the critical 
innovation of DLT may help to provide security and promote trust in a common ledger 
being maintained by a network of anonymous participants without the need of a 
centralised mediator or intermediary (Szostek, 2019). 
 
Figure 3. Bitcoin transaction. Blockchain.com (2020) 
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The blockchain-based DLT is described as pseudo-anonymous (Luu & Imwinkelried, 
2015). Brito & Castillo (2013) classified the blockchain as a parties-unknown/transaction-
known model, a hybrid of the cash payment and intermediary’s system. The transaction 
of Bitcoin in Figure 3 illustrates the anonymity of the blockchain. It may be noted that two 
parties participating in the transaction are coded by a blockchain addresses, which can 
be created without providing personal information. On the other hand, people can easily 
find the information about the transactions on the ledger from public record such as 
blockchain.com, depending on the VC types. Therefore, the blockchain is not considered 
entirely private. Nevertheless, some users complicate this pseudonymity by employing 
a variety of techniques to conceal the connection between the blockchain address and 
the actual transacting person, making it highly challenging for the authority to attribute 
the address to specific people. How the characteristics of blockchain make VC appealing 
to the money launderers and increasing the complexity the forensics to the authority shall 
be discussed in part 2.3.1.  
2.1.2 Increasing relevance of virtual currency & AML risk  
In recent years, the rapid development and growing adoption of VC-related business 
activities have gained the public eye. From the regulatory perspective, the increasing 
relevance of virtual currencies and its AML risk might (i) reshape the financial market 
structurally, (ii) compel the authority to adopt more sophisticated measures to deal with 
elevated AML risks.  
The mass adoption of virtual currency among institutions and countries might reduce the 
reliance on fiat currency and revolutionise the way people or institutions transfer funds. 
When discussing the impact of VC in the global context, Susan Athey, a Stanford 
University professor, emphasised on how virtual currencies could become a “convenient 
and safe form of payment in countries where most citizens do not have bank accounts”, 
“particularly in high-inflation countries” (Athey, 2015). Indeed, in some countries, people 
have started using VCs such as Bitcoin as a second currency because it is much better 
than the existing options. Joe Waltman, GiveCrypto’s executive director, notes that 
virtual currency “has the highest likelihood of being helpful to people in places where the 
money is broken … and there is probably a no better example of broken money right 
now than Venezuela.” Under President Nicolas Maduro’s regime, the country’s bolivar 
recorded hyperinflation reaching above a million percentage (Grinspan, 2019). While the 
Venezuelan civilians turned to cryptocurrency as their vital source of income, their 
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government has used Bitcoin to get around the economic sanctions imposed by the U.S. 
As a result, Venezuela finds itself ranked fourth in the world in terms of Bitcoin trade, 
with an estimation of $3.7 billion in Bitcoin remittances in 2019 (Aguilar, 2019). MIT 
Technology Review (2019) argued that Bitcoin provided the Venezuelan state with a way 
to deviate money around the world when the country was isolated from the global 
financial system.  
Some critics indicate that the astonishing growth of Internet users has driven acceptance 
of VC (Klumov, 2020). In recent years, the global economy is undoubtedly moving 
towards digital solutions and eco-system. According to Internet World Stats, the number 
of worldwide internet users in 2000 was 361 million, whereas, by 2019, this figure 
reached 4.5 billion. Research from (Deutsche Bank, n.d) indicated that the growth of 
cryptocurrency and the internet is directly proportional to each other with a positive 
gradient. It can be observed from Figure 4 that the growth pattern of these two variables 
bears a strong resemblance to each other.  
 
Figure 4. Adoption rates of cryptocurrencies & Internet. Deutsche Bank (n.d.) 
Another factor worth considering how VCs might reshape the financial market structurally 
is the increasing participation of the financial sector into the VC space. Kauflin, (2019) 
noted the substantial investment from individuals and corporations seeking to build 
advanced decentralised peer-to-peer networks since the cryptocurrency bull run in 2017. 
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A notable case is a partnership between Ripple (XRP) and the Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation in October 2017 to create a new interoperable system called Mojaloop that 
would “help unbanked people around the world access digital financial services.” 
(Wintermeyer, 2018). Technology moguls and traditional banks are also in the race of 
getting involved into VC as well. When Facebook announced its plan to launch a new 
token “Libra”, it is clear that this might shake up the global financial system (Paul, 2019). 
JP Morgan Chase, despite having plan to launch their token “JPM Coin”, declined 
Facebook’s invitation to develop Libra over concerns that Libra might be used to violate 
money laundering and sanctions law (Andriotis, et al., 2019). As the Federal Reserve 
Chairman Jay Powell noted "The size of Facebook's network means it could be, 
essentially, immediately systemically important.", it clearly shows that Libra has raised 
awareness of the long-term VC adoption and emphasised the need for more 
sophisticated AML implementation as well as new technologies to enhance compliance 
procedure (Kiernan, 2019). 
2.2 A glance at money laundering of virtual currency 
2.2.1 Money laundering – key definitions and background 
Before the case of the U.S. versus $4,255,625.39 in 1982, the term “money laundering” 
had never appeared in a Judicial or legal context (Ferguson, n.d.). Sharman (2008) 
describes money laundering as a practice of concealing the illegal origins of the money 
obtained from criminal activities. In the legal context, this expression is defined in several 
ways. Majority of the nations adhere to the money laundering concepts adopted by the 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (UNODC, n.d). It implied money laundering as the conversion or transfer of 
the asset, which is derived from any drug trafficking offences, to hide the illegal origin of 
such asset. While the said definition set by the Vienna Convention was limited to only 
drug trafficking offences, FATF and other international organisations have expanded the 
definition to include 20 additional designated categories of offences. For example, the 
list of money laundering criminal offences also contains murder, environmental crime, 
robbery, migrant trafficking, and participation in an organised crime group. (FATF, n.d) 
In the Finnish context, money laundering was defined in the Finnish Criminal Code, 
chapter 32, section 6 (Ministry of Justice, Finland, 2015). According to the section, a 
person is guilty of money laundering if he/she:  
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“(1) receives, uses, converts, conveys, transfers or transmits or possesses 
property acquired through an offence, the proceeds of crime or property replacing 
such property in order to obtain benefit for himself or herself or for another or to 
conceal or obliterate the illegal origin of such proceeds or property or in order to 
assist the offender in evading the legal consequences of the offence; or  
(2) conceals or obliterates the true nature, origin, location or disposition of, or 
rights to, property acquired through an offence, the proceeds of an offence or 
property replacing such property or assists another in such concealment or 
obliteration.” (Ministry of Justice Finland, 2015).  
Regardless of the varying definitions, the essence of this term indicates the process of 
turning the illegally-obtained property into the lawful property with the following purposes: 
(i) to obscure the origin of criminal property, and (ii) to erase and eliminate the trail 
leading to the crime. Despite the fact that the surface of money laundering might be 
simple to define on paperwork, Buchanan (2004) notes that it is incredibly challenging to 
investigate and prosecute the criminal activities.  
From the expert’s point of view, the money laundering phenomenon can have a 
substantial impact on the worldwide economy on multiple aspects (McDowell, 2001). 
First, it encourages criminal financing and corruption, which eventually increases the 
crime rate and disrupt social stability. Second, it might turn a country into a money-
laundering haven. Having this reputation is considered a significant disadvantage to any 
countries because the economy of such countries is less attractive to foreign investors. 
In specific, those countries often face more scrutiny in terms of financial transactions and 
more limited access to the global financial market, which endorses transparency. 
Typically, havens for money laundering tend to have weak AML regime, little 
enforcement of AML provisions, and insignificant penalties. For developing countries, 
reduced access to world markets, especially to the capital market, might intensify the 
poverty situation. Third, money laundering can damage the solidity of the financial 
institutions because it exposes those organisations to reputational, operational, and legal 
risks. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2001) discusses that the trade-offs of 
engaging in money laundering include termination of banking infrastructures, liquidity 
issues, declines in stock value, declines in the stock value, and asset confiscation. For 
instance, regarding the reputational risk, an organisation might lose confidence in its 
soundness and integrity from its major stakeholder. Needless to say, money laundering 
is critical concern towards financial institutions where there are multiple complex 
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counterparty relationships and connections. Finally, money laundering can disrupt and 
compromise the private sector. When criminals use “front stores” to legitimise their illegal 
business, they can form interest groups and monopolise different parts of the private 
sector, leading to the monetary and economic instability (McDowell, 2001).  
AML legal & regulatory approach regarding virtual currency 
The fight against money laundering is undoubtedly a vital priority of international 
organisations. It is widely perceived that money laundering practices often occur 
transnationally ; therefore, domestic measures are often insufficient to address this issue 
(Borliini, 2012). The FATF’s standards (also known as the FATF Recommendations) 
were drafted in February 1990, amended in 1996, in 2003, in 2012 and most recently in 
2019 are the cornerstone of the existing AML paradigm (Nance, 2018). Endorsed by over 
180 countries through different regional affiliated bodies, the FATF’s Standards require 
all nations to formulate effective measures to address and prevent the money laundering 
issue. Regarding the AML measures, FATF outlined the policies and coordination 
between nationally and internationally, confiscation, preventive measures, transparency 
and beneficial ownership, and powers and responsibilities of relevant authorities. In legal 
terms, FATF Recommendations are not considered legally binding, but the Member 
States and affiliated bodies committed to incorporate them into their local and regional 
legislation (Salas, 2005). FATF also partners with the World Bank and IMF to draft the 
methodology for assessing the AML compliance system as well. Therefore, despite the 
limited partnership of the FATF, they remain one of the standard setters regarding money 
laundering penal and regulatory framework.  
In the European Union (EU), the Anti-Money Laundering Directive developed by the EU, 
which is in line with FATF Recommendations, acts as a legislative act regarding the AML 
matter. However, it must be noted that the directive is considered a common goal for all 
Member States to obtain. It means that member states have to devise its own legal and 
regulatory framework to achieve the directive’s goal. The European Commission (EC) 
developed its first Anti-Money Laundering Directive in 1991 (“AMLD1”) to coordinate the 
regulations and measures across all Member States and ensure the financial stability of 
the region. The second amendment came into effect afterwards, leading to the second 
Anti-Money Laundering Directive (*AMLD2”) in 2001, which extended the 
recommendations to include the fight against terrorist financing (Salas, 2005). This 
decision was triggered by the 9/11 terrorist attack and by the disagreement in the 
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definition of serious crimes laid out in the first directive. In February 2012, when FATF 
published their revised recommendations, the EC subsequently modified their term 
coverage to include lawyers, accountants, real estate agencies, and casinos to be 
aligned with the FATF Recommendations. A decade later, fourth Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive (“AMLD4”) came into effect and resolved the ambiguities in the previous 
directive. Although it provided a more rigorous risk-based approach to make the fight 
against money laundering effective, it did not explicitly recognise the VC in its terms. As 
a result, the fifth Anti-Money Laundering Directive (“AMLD5” or “Directive (EU) 
2018/843”) introduced in June 2018, outlined new requirements regarding virtual 
currencies. This directive must be transposed into law by the Member States by January 
10, 2020. The key amendments regarding VC are displayed as follow:  
1. AML scope extension 
to VC 
 
 
The EC now identifies any VC-related businesses as 
“obliged entities”. As a result, the scope is extended to 
include two new types of VC-related service providers: 
virtual currency exchange providers (VCEPs) and 
custodian wallet providers (CWPs). VCEPs are VC 
exchanges which convert traditional fiat currency (e.g. 
USD, EUR, JPY) from their clients and exchange them 
into VC (Bitcoin, Litecoin). Meanwhile, CWPs are 
custodian wallet service providers which safeguard the 
clients’ virtual asset funds. These service providers must 
be registered with the local authorised financial 
supervisory (e.g. Germany’s Federal Financial 
Supervisory Authority BaFin, Finland’s Financial 
Supervisory Authority FIN-FSA). 
 
 
2. Transparency on the 
Ultimate Beneficial 
Owners (UBO) and 
Politically-Exposed 
Persons (PEPs) 
 
Under the AMLD5, the registration of Ultimate Beneficial 
Owner of European businesses would be made publicly 
available. The public access also includes the affiliated 
interconnection of the national registration record. The 
information of the UBOs comprises of name, birth date, 
nationality, country of residence, and beneficial interest. At 
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 the same time, during the AML screening process, 
consulting the beneficial ownership register is compulsory. 
The national PEPs would be put under the same 
examination level as the foreign PEPs and the high-level 
officials of international organisations. Simultaneously, 
Member States must establish public offices or functions 
to help companies identìying the PEPs. 
 
3. Rigorous due 
diligence measures to 
implement transparency 
 
 
VC service providers are now subject to the same AML 
and KYC requirements of any traditional financial 
institutions. For the KYC purposes, all obliged entities 
must use the electronic identification technology that 
complies with the eiDAS regulation for the customer’s 
identity verification purpose. Entities now have to 
determine the Client Due Diligence (CDD) level depending 
on different circumstances. In a generic situation, CDD is 
sufficient. However, in those particular situations outlined 
in the directive where additional measures are specifically 
required, entities must conduct Enhanced Due Diligence 
(EDD). For example, European organisations having 
business relationships or transacting with high-risk third 
countries must conduct EDD. This process requires 
entities to acquire information regarding the source of 
wealth, ownership structure, and reasons for doing 
transactions. 
 
4. More intense 
transactions monitoring 
and suspicious activity 
reporting 
Any financial flows to and from high-risk countries relating 
to money laundering subject to stricter due diligence 
practice. Notably, any transactions of complex nature or 
conducted in an unusual flow shall be must be monitored 
regularly and reported to the governmental entities where 
applicable. 
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Table 1. AMLD5 amendments 
How does Finland comply with the AMLD5? 
The Act on Virtual Currency Providers (572/2019) entered into force on May 1st, 2019. 
The FIN-FSA has also published its Regulations and Guidelines, which entails the 
primary obligations for virtual asset service providers (VASPs). VASPs must be officially 
registered with the FIN-FSA. The obliged entities of this Act comprise of VC exchange 
services, custodian wallet providers, and issuers of virtual currencies. The scope of FIN-
FSA’s definition concerning exchange services include the VAs to VAs exchanges as 
well.  
For those VASPs who had already provided services before the effective date must be 
registered by November 1st, 2019 (FIN-FSA, 2019). By the end of 2019, there are five 
regulated VASPs in Finland. The main requirements that entities must comply for this 
registration include: 
• Basic and fit proper check: To ensure the validity of the entity; 
• Customers’ fund management: To examine the technical compliance level (e.g. 
client’s fund segregation, security practice); 
• Marketing of services: To guarantee the appropriateness of the marketing 
materials displayed to the public;  
• AML regulation compliance: To review the AML policy and risk assessment of the 
entity as required by the regulation 
It must be noted that this new regulation does not change the characteristics of VCs or 
the risks associated with VC-related investments. However, regulated entities are 
responsible for assessing whether the VC is deemed as a financial instrument, as cited 
in the Investment Services Act (747/2012/chapter 1, section 14) (FIN-FSA, 2020).  FATF 
(2019) describes the attitude of the VASPs toward the FIN-FSA regulation as a “total 
turn”.  In the past, VASPs did not want to be regulated, but nowadays, they are keen on 
being regulated. One reason contributing to this significant change might come from the 
limited access to the banking system as VASPs have faced difficulties in opening a bank 
account.  
 
A gap in global AML enforcement regarding VC 
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From a macro perspective, the global AML enforcement regarding VC transactions 
varies widely, from the strict regulations in the U.S. to nearly non-existent practices in 
countries such as Russia and Mexico. Even within the EU, the regulations between the 
Member States vary widely as well. In some instances, the legal status of those is 
considered enigmatic depending on the development of the legislation. For example, 
from 2013 to 2018, the Netherlands did not formally extend their AML regulation to 
address the VC activities. The salient gaps in these regulations present opportunities for 
money launderers to exploit.  
 
Figure 5. The current implementation of VC AML/CFT regulations globally. Cipher Trace (2019) 
Regulations have been tighter for VC business for the past two years. As discussed 
above, international organisations have stepped up implementing stricter rules and 
regulations concerning VC. VASPs are acting fast to meet up with tight restrictions from 
the authority to avoid being shut out of lucrative markets. However, the challenges 
towards comprehensive AML/CTF control remain significant. These difficulties include 
the complication in linking transactions to its ultimate beneficial owners, the discrepancy 
between the regulations and the companies’ AML capacity, and the lack of technological 
understanding from the regulatory. 
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2.2.2 The money laundering processes and methods 
Initially, concerns over money laundering back in the 80s under Reaganomics mainly 
focused on the “war on drugs” (Verhage, 2008:11). Nowadays, the illegal gains are 
generated from a wide range of lucrative criminal engagements. The size and amount 
depend on the nature of the adopted illicit means. For example, in terms of operations, 
a Mexican drug cartel is estimated to generate hundreds of millions to billions of dollars 
in annual revenue. Needless to say, this asset cannot be lawfully deposited into 
established financial institutions because it would trigger the suspicious transaction 
monitoring and blacklisting process, leading to a criminal investigation operated by the 
police and authority. As a result, most scholars argue that money launders would try to 
launder the illicit money following three primary phases: placement, layering and 
integration (UNODC, 2009; Buchanan, 2004). This section shall describe the money 
laundering process both in theory and in the VC sector. 
 
Figure 6. A typical money laundering scheme. Delna (2018) 
Phase 1: Placement 
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In the initial phase of this scheme, criminals deposit the bulk cash obtained from illicit 
activities into the mainstream financial system. Typically, the majority of illegal activities 
generate cash profits, which might be inconvenient and troublesome to conceal in large 
amounts. Therefore, the money launderer has to find an alternative solution to transfer 
large masses of cash into a legitimate set up to display to the financial institutions. The 
most common method is to establish front companies and businesses and record the 
money as legal instruments such as sale orders and cashiers’ checks. Thus, this step is 
considered the most vulnerable phase for law enforcement to detect the proceeds’ 
origins (Bachus, 2004). However, it has to be noted that placement is only relevant when 
the money is transferred into the financial system. In certain circumstances, the funds 
can be used for contraband activities or pay the salary to the illegal immigrants working 
in the front business. In this case, the criminal would not start with placement.  
In the VC sector, virtual currencies can be easily purchased with cash through buy/sell 
platforms or exchanges. Different exchanges or VASPs have different levels of 
compliance regarding identity verification and source of funds declaration. This 
occurrence is because of the wide gap in VC regulations worldwide. On exchanges that 
are negligent to the regulations or are not required to be AML compliant, money 
launderers can anonymously open an account and convert the illegitimate money into 
VCs such as Bitcoin or Ethereum.  
 
Figure 7. Placement via VC OTC desk. Chainanalysis (2019) 
Another path that money launderers use is through over-the-counter (OTC) broker. 
Figure 7 depicts the flow that money launderers used to transfer illicit funds to the Huobi 
exchange. In the traditional financial market, OTC desk often mediates the transactions 
of securities that are not listed on formal exchanges, such as the New York Stock 
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Exchange (NYSE) (Murphy, 2020). OTC brokers tend to deal with the buyers and sellers 
directly and subject to less regulation. It is reported that OTC desk has emerged as a 
“lynchpin of a new type of money laundering” that criminals resort to (Roberts, 2020). 
While exchanges might take days or weeks to process the funds, OTC desks can settle 
the transactions within 24 hours. As a result, when the OTC desk does not conduct 
rigorous Know-Your-Customer (KYC) protocols, money launderers can exploit this 
channel to consolidate illicit cash (Chainanalysis, 2020).  
Phase 2: Layering 
When the illicit fund is successfully placed into the financial system, the second phase 
called “layering” takes place. The ultimate goal of this stage is to obscure the money trail 
and camouflage the original crime (Bachus, 2001; Buchanan, 2004). This process refers 
to the creation of a highly complex and sophisticated web of financial transactions that 
imitates the nature of the legitimate financial activity. From Figure 7, it can be noted that 
offshore financial centres are an essential linchpin in this stage. To evade scrutiny by 
law enforcement and regulators, criminals often wire the funds into the financial system 
via any offshore banks. Cox (2014:17) claims that:  
“The money launderer will move the funds between a number of accounts in a 
number of different jurisdictions and through a series of companies to ensure that 
the trail is as complicated as possible. This will essentially obscure the audit trail 
and sever the link with the original criminal proceeds. The funds can actually ‘spin 
up’ to ten times prior to being integrated into the banking system.” Cox (2014:17) 
VC could serve as a vehicle to transit the funds transnationally because criminals can 
utilise an anonymising service to obscure the fund’s source. In April 2018, the Europol 
exposed a money-laundering operation that was facilitated via a Finnish exchange 
(Europol, 2018). The Spain-based criminals initially split the illicit cash into hundreds of 
third bank accounts. Afterwards, they created a highly complex layering network to 
transfer the money obtained from drug trafficking to Colombia and Panama. Other tactics 
to exploit VCs is to participate in an Initial Coin Offering (ICO), where money launderers 
can exchange one type of VCs for another. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) 
noted that ICOs are “vulnerable to money laundering and terrorist financing risks due to 
the anonymous nature of the transactions, and the ease with which large sums of monies 
may be raised in a short period of time.” (Leong, 2017)  
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Phase 3: Integration 
The final phase of the money laundering scheme is known as integration whereby the 
cleansed funds reintegrated into the economy under a legitimate shell. It is highly 
demanding for law enforcement to distinguish the illegal proceeds and legal ones from 
the integrated affluence. Money launderers usually transformed the money into different 
forms, such as the purchase of assets, such as real estate, financial assets and 
securities, and luxury assets (Bachus, 2001; Buchanan, 2004). 
In VC, criminals can legitimise the illicit fund by directly or indirectly convert the VCs into 
fiat currency. Nowadays, there is an ever-growing list of goods and services that accepts 
VAs as payment method. Additionally, similar to how an offshore bank operates in Figure 
7, online companies can transform dirty VAs into luxurious items as well. For instance, 
Vaultoro is a popular Berlin-based trading platform allowing people to trade between 
cryptocurrency and physical gold (Bloomberg, 2019). Alternatively, ICOs with below-
average compliance control might be abused by money launderers seeking to convert 
their illegal-gained VAs into other types of VAs. Afterwards, the criminals can exit the 
whole money laundering process by selling them when the new VC become listed on the 
exchange.  
2.3 Key AML risks from regulatory standpoint 
As mentioned in the first section, VC is a novel resolution for both individuals and entities 
engaging in criminal activities. The potential risks do not only emerge from the nature of 
the blockchain itself but also the environment circulating the service providers as well. 
As the underlying technology behind VC becomes more evolving and advanced, the law 
enforcement and authority finds it more challenging to tackle the money laundering issue. 
In general, the potential risks linked to VC arise from the following factors: (i) anonymity 
and pseudonymity, (ii) P2P cross-border transaction, and (iii) decentralisation. (Keating, 
et al., 2018) 
2.3.1 Anonymity and pseudonymity 
Keating et al. (2018) emphasised that describing decentralised virtual currencies such 
as Bitcoin as “anonymous” or “untraceable” was insufficient. Instead, it is better to 
describe them as “pseudonymous”. In the VC industry, the ultimate beneficial 
ownership can only be confirmed on customer accounts because the VC transactions 
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stored on the blockchain are from one numbered account to another (Houben & Snyers, 
2018) (Houben & Snyers, 2018). However, it has to be noted that if the law enforcement 
put enough efforts to deploy the proper data-driven techniques, such as quantum 
computing, it is still possible for the authority to detect the users’ identities (Houben and 
Snyers 2018 cited in Dupont 2012:44). Although the information concerning the user’s 
identity cannot be found on the blockchain, other vital information such as transaction 
date, transaction value, counterparties’ deposit addresses, are displayed publicly on 
different blockchain explorer websites. Several private blockchain forensic companies 
have developed tools to de-anonymising VC transactions and scrutinise the illegal 
activities related to those (Wan, 2020). These companies have worked closely with law 
enforcement and VCEPs to analyse the users’ transaction pattern. Therefore, 
theoretically speaking, law enforcement can trace the identity of criminals. Still, 
investigating the personal identities following this approach can be costly and time-
consuming. In some cases, it might not lead to any fruitful results.  
As discussed in the first section, some individuals employ different techniques to add 
another layer of anonymity to obscure the connection between the blockchain address 
and the actual transacting person. Some key techniques that money launderers can 
utilise are:  
• Anonymising tool 
This term refers to tools and services which camouflage the VC transactions, such as 
Tor (darknet). The default P2P protocol of some virtual currencies does not hide the 
Internet Protocol (IP) of people participating in the transaction. Therefore, law 
enforcement can easily follow the IP address to track down the identities of associated 
individuals. Money launderers use this tool because it is an open-source communication 
network which disguises the IP address (Genkin, et al., 2018:78-82).   
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Figure 8. Tor-Onion router communication. Traffic Monitoring and Analysis: Third International 
Workshop (2011) 
As described in Figure 8, this tool routes the communications/transactions through 
different worldwide computers and forwards through an established circuit wrapped in 
highly-complex encryption algorithm (Domingo-Pascual, et al., 2011:113). Therefore, 
this tool confuses law enforcement seeking to locate the computer hosting of the users 
who initiated the transaction. Some criminals even couple Tor with a Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) then combine some mixer tools to disguise and entangle the whole 
money laundering process. 
• Mixer (tumbler) service 
This service combines all involved VC transactions into a mutual address then produces 
output through a semi-random mechanism, making it difficult to link any VC address to 
any specific transaction (Genkin et al., 2018:78-82).The tumbler service provider often 
takes a cut on the transaction fee, usually between 1% and 3% of the total transaction 
value (Allison, 2015). There are various mixing methods, such as centralised solutions, 
peer-to-peer mixing, and decentralised mixing. The mixing mechanism depends on 
different types of service providers. Figure 9 illustrates the most common form of VC 
tumbling. In early 2020, an Ohio-based man was arrested by the Federal Bureau 
Investigation FBI’s Washington Office for operating a VC tumbler service which 
laundered over $300 Million (The U.S. Department of Justice, 2020). This case clearly 
shows that law enforcements are continuously keeping a tab on this illegal practice of 
money laundering.  
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Figure 9. Example of the centralised mixing service. Source: Association for Computing 
Machinery 2018 
There are a handful of virtual currencies developed to be completely anonymous, such 
as Monero and Zcash. These are known as “privacy coins” because the information on 
transactions is not made public. Their masking of transaction data makes it hard for law 
enforcement to trace the original sender because the blockchain does not reflect any 
personal information (Kumar, et al., 2017). Needless to say, these coins might hold some 
appeal for money laundering actors due to its private nature.  
2.3.2 Cross-border transaction 
Another characteristic of virtual currency that elevates the AML risk is the cross-border 
transaction. Without any regulated intermediaries, the money launderers can transfer the 
virtual asset internationally (Keatinge, 2018:36). This feature has attracted criminals 
such as ransomware hackers, drug traffickers, and extortionist. These groups usually 
receive payments in virtual currency from different worldwide locations. The situation 
becomes more complicated because those criminals could take advantage of the gap in 
the AML regulations among different nations or the political conflicts between countries 
to thread their way through the detection of law enforcement. In early 2019, CiPherTrace 
reported a 46% increase in the number of cross-border transactions from American 
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virtual currency exchanges to offshore exchanges (Huillet, 2019). Indeed, this increase 
is alarming to the authorities as the domestic regulation might shield these transactions.  
The existence of worldwide Bitcoin ATMs further accelerates the money laundering 
activities. There are nearly 7000 Bitcoin ATMs placed in different locations worldwide, 
with the highest concentration in the U.S. and Europe (Pirus, 2020). The Colombian drug 
cartel was detected to use Bitcoin ATM to launder their illicit funds across Europe in 
2019. The whole operation was estimated to have cleaned around €9 million before it 
was busted by Spain’s Guardia Civil (Aguilar, 2019). This case proves that the use of 
virtual currency to facilitate cross-border transactions makes it more difficult for law 
enforcement to trace to the illicit origin.  
2.3.3 Decentralisation 
This factor does not concern the centralised virtual currency such as a game coin or 
Webmoney. However, it must be noted that the majority of virtual currency are 
decentralised. This feature makes virtual currency risky from the regulatory perspective 
because there is no central authority that can prohibit any individuals from getting access 
to the virtual currency network or penalise or suspend it. Keatings (2018) describes this 
characteristic as "censorship-resistant" because it enables people who seek unrestricted 
access to virtual asset fundraising and allocation. On Figure 10, it can be seen that while 
the transactions of centralised currency circulate around one central authority, the 
transactions on the decentralised side have multiple sub-authorities, known as the 
intermediaries. In reality, the decentralised networks have multiple of centralised 
intermediates such as virtual currency exchanges, custodian wallets or atomic swaps 
(Wright & Filippi, 2015). New users who want to access the virtual currency network for 
the first time typically convert their fiat currency into virtual currency on the exchanges. 
If they're going to execute large trading blocks, they can do so via the OTC trading desk 
of those exchanges as well. 
On exchanges that are regulated and fully compliant to the AML regulations, if law 
enforcement wants to trace a transaction on those exchanges, the information regarding 
users' identities should be available. Such exchanges often have well-defined AML policy 
detailing specific AML process, rigorous identity verification procedure, meticulous risk 
assessment framework, and effective transaction monitoring. Some major exchanges, 
such as Coinbase, Kraken, and Gemini are considered the financial institutions of the 
virtual currency field (Fitzpatrick, 2019). They typically place deposit or withdrawal 
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limitations, depending on the account verification level. For example, on Coinbase, a 
user has to reach the Pro-level of verification to withdraw up to USD 10 000 per day. 
Besides, virtual currency exchanges can restrict or ban user access to the service 
depending on the geographical locations from IP address or violation of Terms and 
Conditions. Therefore, practically speaking, money launderers still face restraints from 
exchanges that comply fully with the AML regulations.  
 
Figure 10. Centralised vs Decentralised. Source: Wright & Filippi, 2015 
However, the elevated risk lies on exchanges and OTC desks that do not adhere strictly 
to the AML regulation or do not need to be AML compliant due to lack of local legislation 
(Chain analysis, 2020). Apart from the centralised exchanges mentioned in the previous 
paragraph, there are also decentralised exchanges (DEXs) which facilitate P2P 
transactions among their users using a unique exchange method known as an atomic 
swap. These swaps establish automated contracts that operate based on predetermined 
rules zero-fee trading. This decentralised nature can be considered a vulnerable money 
laundering point to law enforcement because some of these exchanges do not 
implement KYC control. A notable name is "bisq" (formerly Bitsquare), a DEX which only 
requires no name, no ID documents but just an email to register an account on its 
platform. Indeed, zero-KYC action intensifies the money laundering risks. 
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3 Methodology and analytical framework 
3.1 Methodology  
The study applies a case study approach which involves qualitative analysis. Yin, 
(2003:13) defines a case study as “an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary 
phenomenon in depth and within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries 
between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. Unlike quantitative research 
which mainly consists of statistical generalisations (Jackson, 2008), the qualitative 
analysis focuses more on understanding the fundamental nature of the research problem 
(Strauss & Corbin, 1994). As the case study provides “the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events” and answers the how or why question, it is aligned with 
the study’s objectives (Tellis, 1997:4). As addressed in section 1, the author aims at 
developing an AML internal process in a Finnish case company. Therefore, the case 
study is the most suitable approach to identify the business challenge and provide 
solution to match the European regulation as transposed into law in Finland.  
The thesis research design is displayed in Figure 11 below. Before starting the research, 
the author decides the general details such as case study objective, case selection, 
research timeline and interview location, and determines the required skills and 
techniques. The case study’s goal is to reinforce the current AML internal process of the 
case company to comply with the regulatory requirements from the FIN-FSA. In the first 
phase, the author discusses the existing compliance challenges in the case company. 
To do so, the author prepares the data, identifies the criterion sampling, and conducts 
the relevant interviews with the company’s personnel. Afterwards, combing the internal 
documentation, the author revises the AML internal process based on the current state 
analysis, focusing on strengthening the case company’s AML program. Lastly, the author 
validates the process by acquiring feedbacks from a compliance consultant associated 
with the case company.  
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Figure 11. Research design  
When designing the case study, the author decides whether the case is a good one 
based on recommendations from Kardos & Smith (1979). Firstly, a good case is the one 
taken from real life, although the real identities can be concealed. Secondly, the case 
should consist of many parts, and each part typically ends with problems and points for 
discussion. Thirdly, the case should include sufficient information for the readers to treat 
the issues. Finally, it should be believable for the reader.  
3.2 Data Collection & Data Analysis  
The qualitative data for this thesis was collected from three different stages to make sure 
that it is valid and reliable. The primary data was acquired through in-depth interviews. 
The use of qualitative data is prioritised in this thesis because it is insightful and allow 
access to the case (Yin, 1984:80).  
The three data stages are displayed in Table 2 below.  
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Data Stage Data Source Data Type Period Content 
1. Current 
State 
Analysis 
Case 
company’s 
personnels 
Face-to-face 
interview 
11/2019 
Conducting interview 
about the current AML 
implementation status 
and challenges of the 
company 
2. New 
proposal 
regarding 
the internal 
AML 
process 
Personal 
Observation 
Field notes 
08/2019 
- 
02/2020 
Observing the AML 
process (e.g. KYC, 
Transaction Monitoring, 
compliance technology, 
etc) 
Company’s 
internal 
documentation 
Documentati
on 
08/2019 
- 
02/2020 
Reviewing the case 
company’s internal 
guidelines and revising 
the AML model 
3. 
Validation 
of the 
Proposal 
The 
compliance 
consultant 
Face-to-face 
interview 
03/2020 
Conducting interview to 
validate and evaluate the 
AML reference model 
Table 2. Data dollection methods 
The first data stage was collected from the face-to-face interviews and the author’s 
observation to conduct the current state analysis. The company’s COO was chosen as 
the respondent because that person has the most knowledge of compliance issues in 
the case company. The interviews were conducted in English on a regular conversational 
basis.  This author tried to create a pleasant atmosphere to help the respondent to openly 
share the opinions and insights precisely the way he means it. This approach is 
considered attractive because it involves little cost, which makes people feel familiar with 
their everyday conversations (Denscombe, 2010). The data from this interview was 
recorded by a recording device and inscribed on the author’s field notes. Also, the 
author’s observation over the six months was used in this stage to gain direct insight into 
the case company’s actual AML practice.  
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The next data stage was compiled from the case company’s internal documentation, 
including documents such as AML policy and documents detailing the IT infrastructure 
for blockchain analytics. The key findings of this phase would be combined with the data 
from the first phase to design an enhanced AML reference model aiming at improving 
the existing AML program. The details of the documentation are displayed in Table 3 
below:   
 Name of the document 
Number 
of 
Pages 
Description 
1 
Anti-Money Laundering and 
Counter Terrorist Financing 
Policy (“AML/CTF Policy”) 
17 
Description of the fundamental AML 
principles of the case company to 
prevent and mitigate the AML risks 
2 
CDD/KYC Application form 
for Individuals and 
Corporate Clients 
2 
The standard KYC form for general 
clients and counterparties 
3 
EDD/KYC Application form 
for Individuals and 
Corporate Clients 
2 
The standard KYC form for high-risk 
clients abd counterparties 
4 
Identification Verification 
Process 
3 
Description of the process and 
technology employed to verify the 
identity of the clients and 
counterparties 
5 Legal Documents 35 
All legal documents related to the 
registration of the case company to 
the authority 
6 
Guidelines from the Finnish 
police 
15 
Presentation slides from the Finnish 
police detailing the sufficient AML 
measures 
Table 3. Internal documentation details 
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The last data stage is to evaluate and validate the AML reference model by interviewing 
with a local compliance consultant. The selection of the respondent was decided based 
on the level of expertise in the compliance field. The critical requirement is that the person 
should have a high level of understanding to both compliance and the virtual currency 
sector. The author first approached the compliance consultant via email and scheduled 
a video call in March 2020.  
4 Case study 
4.1 Current State Analysis 
About the case company 
The case company of this thesis is a small company operating as a registered virtual 
asset service provider founded in Finland. The company’s vision is to build an investment 
service that supports the growing adoption of virtual currency in the near future. Backed 
by reputable equity investors and venture capitalists with a proven track record, the 
company provides tailored asset management services to different customer segments. 
The team members of the company have a blend of deep expertise in traditional finance, 
blockchain, software development, and regulation, having worked at Tier-1 financial 
institutions around the world. After a period of operation, the business model of the case 
company is confirmed to be scalable with positive growth indicators. The revenue of the 
company was estimated to grow 120% in Q3 2019 and projected to continue this growth 
until Q3 2020.  
The business challenges 
As virtual currency spread across the world, the regulations become more and more 
developed to govern them. It is noted in the literature review that the regulatory 
landscape of VC is continuously evolving, especially in the European Union. From the 
company’s point of view, the legal risk coming from lack of awareness or 
misunderstanding of the law related to the business might result in detrimental damages, 
including financial and reputational loss. The registration of the company with the local 
FSA has shown the company’s determination to be fully compliant with the legal 
requirements. The Directors at the case company fully understands the importance of an 
efficient AML internal process to the existence of the business. The first reason is to 
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establish the legitimacy of the business toward not only law enforcement but also the 
company’s counterparties as well. As the virtual currency is considered an evolutionary 
field yet utterly new to the traditional finance world, it has long faced restricted access 
and doubts from the investors’ network. In the growth strategy of the company, 
developing a partnership relationship is crucial in scaling the business model. To do so, 
having a comprehensive AML program is considered a significant advantage in gaining 
trust from different counterparties and VASPs. Indeed, significant VASPs around the 
world have stepped up to endorse transparency in the field. As a result, a positive 
reputation in compliance comes in as a key to establish the reputation and legitimacy to 
ensure the stability and growth of the business model. The second reason is that the 
company needs a competent model that would save up time in the execution process. 
In the AML staff training, having a clear process chart will make it easier to assign the 
tasks to the correct departments, thus, removing the redundant stages. At the same time, 
the case company acknowledges the risk of having weak AML implementation. The AML 
approach of the company critically identifies the following factors: 
 
Figure 12. Case company AML approach 
The company seeks to monitor closely and regularly update the AML Policy and internal 
procedure to ensure the most efficient compliance practice possible. The list of interview 
questions can be found in Appendix 1.  
Adequate internal 
controls to 
guarantee 
compliance with 
the requirements 
Timely update on policy, 
rules and regulations
A risk-based 
approach 
addressing all 
AML risk related 
to the business
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From the discussion between the author and the company’s key compliance personnel, 
there are currently two key issues that the company needs to address:  
(i) At the moment, the Compliance Officer is the only personnel duly authorised to 
guarantee the effective implementation and enforcement of the AML/KYC procedure as 
well as supervise all AML aspects related to the business. At the same time, at the 
impressive growth rate of the business, the company needs to hire new sales and 
customer representatives to engage more with the customers and drive in more sales 
pipelines. This situation has left the company to question whether the compliance 
department can coordinate with the Sales and the Technology team to make the current 
internal AML process better and more effective. In this case, the company needs to 
structure an efficient internal AML process to address this possible new change.  
(ii) Along with the mentioned change and considering the operational risk, the company 
needs better internal AML information and communication flow. The company 
wants to explore whether there is any better communication flow than the existing one, 
given that the AML process will have multiple information points in the scenario above. 
This internal validity is needed before implementing the changes expected to occur in 
Q4 2020.  
4.2 Build the Proposal  
This section develops a proposal to improve the internal AML process (Figure 13) after 
considering the business challenges. The conceptual process has been created based 
on in-depth interviews, author’s observation, the company’s internal documentation, and 
literature review materials. This process shall provide guidelines and address the 
relevant AML mitigation controls.  
The AML process involves four internal components in the case company: sales and 
customer relations, IT, Compliance department, and Board of Directors. It is triggered 
when a customer registers an account and enters the relationship with the case 
company.  
From the figure below, the arrow indicates the sequential flow of the process, while the 
dashed arrow implies the communication and information flow. 
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Figure 13. AML Internal Process Proposal 
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As the case company provide virtual currency-related financial offerings, the AML 
process is attached to the daily operations such as account management and database 
monitoring. The AML process above is divided into four correlative activities: Customer 
Onboarding, Continuous Monitoring, Suspicious Transaction Reporting, and Audit AML 
Risk Assessment. First, the Customer Onboarding process includes KYC, customer 
identification program, customer screening, and AML risk assessment. After approving 
the customer to open an account, the compliance officer has to run all transactions 
through continuous monitoring to mitigate the AML risk during the process further. During 
the establishment of the customer relationship or when conducting the virtual currency 
transactions, if the company suspects that transaction is related to money laundering 
schemes, then the company shall immediately report a suspicious transaction to the FIU 
via an electronic form or on the special ground if necessary. On special occasions that 
trigger the Audit AML Risk Assessment, the Compliance Department has to assign an 
officer to analyse the AML program as a whole. The Board of Directors must approve 
the final decision to update the risk assessment before implementation. 
4.2.1 Customer Onboarding Process 
Upon entering the customer relationship with the company, the customer has to fill in a 
mandatory KYC form initially. As required in section 14, subsection 1 of the Act on Virtual 
Currency Providers (572/2019), the process of assessing the risk level of each customer 
begins with verifying the customer’s identity and collecting other relevant data 
(Valtiovarainministeriö, 2019). Examples are such as proof of residential address, 
government identification number, general information on the source of fund, PEP status 
declaration and purpose of service usage. In this KYC form, the customer must review 
and agree to the Terms of Service and confirm the responsibility to provide accurate 
information.  
The essence of this process is for the case company to (i) establish the customer identity, 
and (ii) obtain the preliminary understanding of the potential AML risks possibly linked to 
the customer. This process produces the first input data for the compliance team to 
conduct the risk assessment later. Customer profiles that have deficient or incomplete 
KYC information fail to sufficiently represent the customer and might lead to inaccurate 
risk rating. Therefore, the sales and customer representatives are responsible for 
diligently collecting the most accurate data possible and inserting this data into the 
internal database and monitoring system. During this phase, the company has to keep 
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the KYC information on entries in the register for five years from the date ending the 
customer relationship as required by section 10 of the Act on Virtual Currency Providers 
(572/2019). If a customer registers a corporate account, the identity of the authorised 
representative should be verified. According to the main change regarding UBO 
mentioned in Table 1, the company should identify the UBOs on a case-by-case basis. 
However, based on Directive 2004/39/EC, the corporate customer does not have to 
disclose the UBOs information and identity if it is a publicly listed company on regulated 
exchanges in one or several European Economic Area (EEA) region. This exemption 
also includes credit institutions if they have UBOs information available on request (FIN-
FSA, 2018). If the company cannot identify the customer or perform the KYC actions, it 
should refuse to enter the customer relationship or conducting VC transactions. This 
case should be reported to the FIU depending on a case-by-case basis. 
The proof of residential/business address can be a utility bill, bank statements, tax 
documents of the customers within the past three months. 
Customer Identification Program  
Once the customer verification data enters the internal database, the IT Department is 
responsible for verifying the customer’s identity using the existing technological 
techniques or outsourcing to the third party. If the IT Department outsources this process 
to the third party, the company has to ensure that the third party vendor must comply 
with the guidelines on customer identification. However, the identification data must be 
stored in the database throughout the data retention period defined by section 10 of the 
Act on Virtual Currency Providers (572/2019). Afterwards, the IT officer has to send an 
identification report to the Compliance Department to proceed forward to customer 
screening.  
The identity of any natural person should be verifiable based on a valid official 
identification document. If the company suspects the authenticity of the ID document, it 
should reserve the right to send a request for additional identity information to the 
customer. All ID documents have to contain the customer’s picture and the validity 
period. According to the Standard 2.4 Customer Due Diligence of FIN-FSA, the company 
should accept the following ID documents: 
• Valid documents issued by the Finnish authorities: 
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o A driving license;  
o National identification card;   
o Passport, diplomatic passport; 
o Alien's passport, refugee travel document;   
o SII card containing photo (SII card is no longer issued since October 
2008) 
• Valid documents issued by the foreign authorities: 
o National passport issued by the foreign authority;  
o ID card accepted as a valid travel document.  
The scan of these documents should be an original and high-resolution scan without 
being altered by photoshop. If the customer submits the passport scan, the MRZ 
graphical format must be visible so that the validity of the document is confirmed. If the 
ID document and proof of address are in the non-Latin format (e.g. Thai, Hebrew, 
Chinese), a notarised translation copy should be attached in the KYC form as well.  
Customer Screening 
Customer Screening is an crucial stage in the Customer Onboarding process. The 
Compliance Department is responsible for screening the customer data against the 
relevant external and internal PEP and sanction list databases. The Compliance Officer 
has to pay attention to not only the PEP but also to immediate family members and close 
associates of PEPs. They might enter the business relationship with the company. 
Likewise, the sanction lists in terms of persons, companies and commodities imposed 
by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and the EU should also be examined. 
An example of an entity belongs to the UNSC consolidated list is Islamic Republic of Iran 
Shipping Lines and Pyongyang-based Kwangson Banking Corporations.  
According to the FATF Guidance on PEPs (FATF, 2013), the company should consider 
the following relevant points: 
• Ensure the customer’s PEP status is up-to-date: The Compliance Officer has to 
regularly check the PEP status of customers because sometimes they can 
become a PEP after entering the business relationship with the company;  
• Use the Internet and media searches: Internet searches can help locating 
relevant information, but the reliability of the data should be considered; 
36 
  
• Use of commercial databases and third-party agent: The Compliance Officer 
should be cautious when using such databases because they have limitations 
regarding the accuracy level and the requirement by the authority. The PEP 
definitions of those databases and services should be verified to be aligned with 
the definition adopted in Finland. The most common databases are Office of 
Foreign Assets Controls (OFAC) and World-Check by Thomson Reuters; 
• Use of general information publicised by competent authorities: This is useful to 
determine whether a PEP tries to abuse the financial system or not, depending 
on the corruption level; 
• Use of in-house databases and information sharing within the industry or the 
country;  
• Use of government-issued PEP lists; 
AML Risk Assessment  
Once the KYC, CIP and screening data enters the internal database and monitoring 
system, the Compliance Officer conducts the AML risk assessment to evaluate the risk 
factors and control environment. In a small company, the responsibility to oversee this 
process lies in the Compliance Officer. However, if the company plans to expand the 
business, the Compliance Department can hire more risk analysts to execute this 
process, given that sufficient staff training is provided. When evaluating the risks related 
to the business, it is essential to define the scope of the assessment. It should cover all 
inherent money laundering risk factors to classify and assign an individual risk level to 
the customer. In the case company context, the AML risk profile is important to formulate 
the total risk level related to the customer. In this section, the author applies the three 
risk assessment phases by the The Wolfsberg Group (2015) to the case company as 
follow 
1. to identify the inherent risk factors and vulnerabilities, 
2. to assess the risk controls, 
3. to derive the residual risk level and assign the risk level to the customer.  
Phase 1: Define the inherent risk factors 
Inherent risk is defined as the current risk exposure of the company to the money 
laundering activities before implementing the mitigation controls (ECA, 2013).The author 
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divides the inherent risk factors to four risk categories which are relevant to the virtual 
currency service providers.   
The current AML inherent risk factors related to the case company are displayed in 
Figure 14. The list is neither binding nor exhaustive.  
 
Figure 14. Inherent AML risk factor consideration 
Upon examining the inherent risk factors, the Compliance Department should weigh 
these components to a risk category rating. A quantitative risk rating can be scored into 
a 5-tier rating scale, ranging from 0 to 100. The fewer the point is, the lower money 
laundering risk is associated with the company. This risk rating should be updated 
frequently to keep the assessment as accurate as possible.  
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• 21 - 40: Low-Med risk 
• 41 - 60: Medium risk 
• 61 - 80: Med-High risk 
• 81 - 100: High risk 
When using the quantitative rating scale, the Compliance Department has to ensure the 
risk rating scale reflects the risk categories realistically and objectively. 
 
Phase 2: Assess the risk controls  
 
Once the inherent risk factors are examined, the Compliance Officer has to analyse the 
operating efficiency of the internal AML risk controls. Here are the aspects to consider: 
• KYC, CDD, and EDD process:  
- whether the KYC procedure adequately addresses the AML risk related 
to the inherent risks; 
• Data Retention and Record-Keeping:  
- whether the customer’s profiles are complete and accurate; 
- whether the internal database is up-to-date and available in case of 
reporting to FIU;  
• Continuous Monitoring and Controls:  
- whether the level of reliance on the third-party service is acceptable; 
- whether the detection of unusual transactions is accurate; 
- whether the technological capacity is appropriate; 
• Staff Training:  
- whether the employees receive proper AML training to ensure the AML 
competence level in operations;  
• AML Policy and the company’s governance:  
- whether the AML governance and policies address the AML risk 
adequately;  
- whether the AML training is frequently organised to update on any 
regulatory changes; 
• Suspicious Transactions Reporting:  
- whether the existing information exchange and cooperation channel 
between the case company and the relevant authority is smooth;  
- whether the suspicious transaction is reported on time to the authority.  
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Each of the area mentioned above should be scrutinised meticulously. Each of the 
categories above should be rated based on the weighting factor. If the mitigation controls 
are found deficient, the Compliance Department is responsible for conducting the internal 
audit AML assessment and sending the proposal to the Board of Directors for approval. 
Once the Board accepts the changes, the Compliance has to update the risk assessment 
framework duly and organise the staff training to ensure the synchronisation in AML 
operation across all departments.  
 
Phase 3: Derive the residual risk level and assign the risk level to the customer. 
The final phase of AML risk assessment is to calculate the residual risk after considering 
the mitigation controls (The Wolfsberg Group, 2015). The residual risk calculation is the 
subtraction of the inherent risk level to the mitigation control. After determining the 
residual risk level, the Compliance Department would assign the due diligence action 
depending on the risk level. If the risk rating ranges from 0 to 60, the Compliance shall 
apply the standard Due Diligence process. If the risk rating ranges from 61 to 100, the 
Compliance shall proceed to the Enhanced Due Diligence procedure.  
Below is an illustrative example of a risk assessment (this example does not represent 
any real cases): 
 
Inherent Risk Level 
Mitigation 
Controls 
Residual 
Risk 
Level 
Due 
Diligence 
Action 
Custo
mers 
Produ
ct 
Geogr
aphics 
Other 
risks 
   
Custome
r X 
5 10 8 9 5 
27 
(Low-
Med) 
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CDD 
Custome
r Z 
15 25 20 18 3 
75 
(Med-
High) 
Enhanced 
DD 
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Custome
r… 
- - - - - - - 
Table 4. AML risk assessment example 
Enhanced Due Diligence 
Once the Compliance Department assigns the EDD to the customer, the Customer 
Representative shall send the customer request for additional information. To comply 
with the Customer Due Diligence Code of Conduct of FIN-FSA (2010), the EDD process 
should be applied in the following cases:  
- Customer or UBO who has a link to the high-risk third countries outlined 
by the European Commission; 
- Customer who is a PEP; 
- non-face-to-face identification; 
- The residual risk level is medium to high; 
- When the blockchain analytics implies the unusual transaction pattern or 
when the blockchain address links to the money laundering practice. 
However, it should be noted that the EDD process has to address the level of risk on a 
case-by-case basis realistically. For example, if a customer declares on the KYC form 
that the source of wealth is from employment income, the Compliance Officer can ask 
the customer to provide the identity of the employer, latest accounts or tax declaration, 
recent payslip, etc. When the customer delivers the request document or information, 
the Customer Representative has to enter the data into the internal database. The 
Compliance Department then assesses if the information is sufficient to determine 
whether the company accepts or rejects the establishment of the customer relationship.  
4.2.2 Continuous Monitoring & Suspicious Transaction Reporting 
Ongoing monitoring is required to guarantee those suspicious transactions are duly 
detected and reported to the law enforcement. In some instances, the Compliance 
Department can initiate the EDD to request the customer to provide additional 
documents and information. At the same time, the Compliance Department can 
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immediately suspend the customer’s account if it is suspected to engage in money 
laundering activities.  
Examples of suspicious transaction activities include but not limited to: 
- The VC transactions are not compatible with the characteristics of the 
business activity declared by the customers; 
- The customer is suspected of falsifying the documents or refuses to 
disclose the required information; 
- The blockchain analytics detects the blockchain address of the customer 
for having a connection with the money laundering activities. 
During the Customer Onboarding or the Continuous Monitoring process, if the 
Compliance Department detects such cases, it shall notify and file in an electronic report 
to the Financial Intelligence Unit with detailed instructions.  
4.3 Validation of the Proposal 
In this stage, the author validates the proposal to examine whether the AML internal 
process would realistically address the business challenges provided by the case 
company.  
The validation process was conducted through an in-depth interview with a local 
compliance consultant (“Informant X”) who has substantial experience in both the virtual 
currency industry and legal framework. The author discussed with the informant about 
the AML Internal Process Proposal to (i) evaluate the feasibility of the proposal regarding 
the business challenge, and (ii) assess whether the process adequately covers the legal 
requirements imposed by the law enforcement in the Finnish context.  
The overall evaluation of the proposal was positive. Informant X noted that having an 
AML internal process would provide the company with an advantage to deal with the 
AML risk. The most inherent benefit is that the process would reduce the company’s 
resources spent on coordinating the compliance matter, thus, save the cost. By 
implementing the process, the company can allocate the resources to other departments 
and projects, such as research and development. Another considerable gain is 
communication flow. According to the feedback, a swimlane process chart details the 
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responsibility of each department precisely, therefore, saves time during the execution 
process.  
“Some parts of this process are sufficient to be put into operation: The Customer 
Onboarding process, Suspicious Transaction Activity, responsibility division, and 
the information flow.” (Informant X) 
However, informant X also emphasised that there were still areas of improvement before 
implementing the process model. First, regarding the AML risk assessment, informant X 
noted the importance of the human factor, which was not mentioned in the proposal. 
According to Informant X, if the company plans to expand the team members and recruit 
more sales representatives, it is crucial to notice the possible human error during the 
process.  
“There should be a section in the chart addressing the underlying human factor 
to ensure the occurrence of human error.” (Informant X) 
Second, informant X discussed that the process needs a complete data structure 
because it determines the strength of the AML regime. Notably, the risk rating mentioned 
in the AML risk assessment proposal should be evaluated carefully. This evaluation is 
because some qualitative risk factors cannot be reflected in a quantifying rating scale. 
Informant X articulated that the risk rating needs long-term testing at the case company 
to ensure the validity of the data.  
The interview concluded that the proposal is functional but not adequate to put into 
implementation immediately concerning the timeline provided by the case company. 
Although the overall process still needs more development, the proposal was seen as a 
good fundamental foundation to create a more detailed and tailored AML internal process 
for future references. Some sub-activities of the process can be enforced based on the 
timeline outlined by the company.  
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5 Discussion and Conclusion 
5.1 Summary 
The objective of this thesis is to combine the literature and legal framework related to 
virtual currency to create an AML internal process for a case company in the Finnish 
context.  
In the present, as detailed in the literature review, money launderers and criminals are 
continuously utilising sophisticated technology to bypass the detection of law 
enforcement. Consequently, the authority is tightening the regulations given the 
widespread growth of VC. In the European context, the introduction of AMLD5 in 2018 
has changed the stance and business landscape of virtual currency service providers. 
Companies have strived to meet the necessary legal requirements to hedge the 
reputational risk and ensure the existence of the business. However, companies find it 
highly difficult when applying the lengthy legal framework to the actual implementation. 
Having an efficient AML internal process is seen as an advantage to reinforce the AML 
program. Companies having a positive reputation regarding the compliance practice 
shows the integrity in dealing with the elevated money laundering risks considering the 
high level of complexity in this field.  
The study features a qualitative case study in the Finnish context. The fundamental of 
the case study derives from the increasing complexity of the AML offences, the growth 
of VC in the modern context, and the vast global AML gap concerning regulation and 
actual practice. The company is a Finnish VASP aiming at building an investment service 
that supports the growing adoption of virtual currency in the near future. The study 
started with the current state analysis of the company to determine critical business 
challenges. The first data from the interview revealed that the case company aimed at 
exploring a new AML internal process to establish the legitimacy of the business and 
improve the internal communication flow, given a possible change in personnel 
speculated to happen in the future. More importantly, it must be noted that the process 
has to take into consideration the AML risks and the legal requirements outlined in the 
literature review.  
Against this background, the proposal was built and tailored to the case company 
through in-depth interviews, company’s documentation, legislative materials and 
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author’s observation. The output was a swim lane chart, which specifically detailed both 
sequence flow and information flow in the company. This process was found to be a 
feasible solution to agile compliance execution, which is aligned with the case company’s 
AML approach: 
1. A risk-based approach addressing all AML risks related to the business 
2. Adequate internal controls to ensure compliance with the legal requirements 
3. The timely update on policy, rules, and regulations 
The process is divided into four correlative activities, namely: (i) Customer Onboarding 
Process, (ii) Continuous Monitoring, (iii) Suspicious Transaction Reporting, and (iv) Audit 
AML Risk Assessment. The idea behind this proposal is to help to define the AML risk 
mitigation controls correspondent to the legal requirements while always having an 
internal audit. The proposal also makes sure that each department is fully aware of the 
responsibility to avoid wasting time and resources, given that the AML process would be 
repetitive and continuous in real-life scenarios.  
Lastly, the proposal was evaluated and validated through an in-depth interview between 
the author and the local compliance consultant. In general, the proposal was seen as a 
feasible solution. Certain parts of the process (e.g. Customer Onboarding, information 
flow) adequately address the business challenges. However, it was recommended by 
the consultant that the whole process should not be put into implementation according 
to the scenario drafted by the company because it needs more testing, especially the 
risk rating and risk criteria in AML risk assessment. 
5.2 Reliability and Validity 
Patton (2002) argued that the reliability and validity of research are essential concerns 
for any qualitative researcher designing a study, analysing the results, and determining 
the quality of the study. The author assesses the thesis reliability based on the four 
criteria: credibility (internal validity), transferability (external validity), dependability 
(reliability), and confirmability (objectivity) (Lincoln & Guba, 1985).   
Credibility (Internal Validity) 
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This criterion is also known as internal validity, which answers to the question “How 
congruent are the findings with reality? (Shenton cited in Merriam, 2004:64). The 
credibility can be assessed by adopting the well-established research methods, 
developing an early familiarity with the culture of a participating organisation, performing 
triangulation, conducting reflective commentary. In this thesis, the author ensures the 
credibility of the study by engaging in the case company to gain an adequate 
understanding of the business challenge and establish the mutual trust with the 
company’s personnel before conducting the research. This strategy would ensure the 
collection of honest feedback and review from the informant. 
Moreover, the author combines different methods and data sources, from the in-depth 
interview and internal documentation to personal observation. The supporting 
documents obtained from the case company provided comprehensive information 
regarding policy and governance. At the same time, the five-month period of personal 
inspection supported the author in understanding the compliance in practice. Meanwhile, 
another angle of triangulation was utilised as the author involve different informants for 
each research phases. The individual standpoint and experiences of each informant 
would enrich the research outcome. 
Transferability (External Validity) 
The transferability of research is “concerned with the extent to which the findings of one 
study can be applied to other situations” (Shenton cited in Merriam, 2004:69). In other 
words, the primary concern is whether the result of this study can be applied to a broader 
sample. In the case study, the process was constructed based on the legal requirements 
outlined by FATF and the EU, along with the theoretical framework of compliance. 
However, it must be noted that the author’s proposal was tailored to address the specific 
business challenge of the company in the Finnish context. Therefore, the author 
emphasised that some process details might not apply to other institutions due to the 
different nature of business. Readers are recommended to critically analyse whether the 
proposal is pertinent on a case by case basis, given that this research only involves a 
single sample company in thousands of virtual currency businesses around the world.  
Dependability 
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The author has to assess whether the result remains the same if the work were repeated 
using the same method and in the same context to determine the dependability of the 
research (Shenton, 2004:71). Reliability of a study can be achieved through thorough 
research design, meticulous operational detail, and reflective appraisal of the paper. In 
the thesis paper, the research design, data collection methods, and internal 
documentation were reported in detail. However, the data from the interviews might be 
exposed to the bias, which is unavoidable, given that the respondent might not want to 
reveal the company’s internal problem wholly. To mitigate bias, the author tried to create 
a comfortable environment and draft the appropriate interview questions. The fact that 
the case company agreed to show the author the confidential documents and involve her 
in high-level compliance discussion clearly shows their determination in disclosing the 
actual practice. However, the author insists that virtual currency is still a relatively new 
field with not many academic papers available. Therefore, the author had to feature 
multiple figures from Medium blogs as an illustration mean. However, the core theoretical 
and legal framework was obtained from the official regulations and structure of reputable 
organisations.  
Confirmability 
This criterion indicates the level of the author’s influence on the research, including the 
investigator bias. While doing the case study, the author emphasised on the fact that she 
spent a year working at the case company. Therefore, she knows the company’s actual 
AML practice. The author tends to reduce the impact of her personal belief by displaying 
the methodological description and reaffirming the reflective commentary. During the 
research period, the author tried to confirm her understanding of the issue with the 
compliance consultant to avoid bias. 
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Appendix 1. Interview Questions for Case Company Personnel 
 
Topic Questions 
1. General Compliance 
Background 
- What is the company’s overall AML strategy? 
- How relevant is the compliance issue to the business? 
- Who is responsible for designing the AML Program? 
- Can you walk me through the worst pain of your AML 
program from your point of view? 
- What are the possible changes in the business 
environment that might affect the compliance decisions? 
2. Customer Onboarding 
Process 
- Can you describe the general customer onboarding 
process?  
- What are the required documents of 
individual/corporate customers? 
- How do you store the customer’s data? 
- How do you communicate with the customers? 
- How do you transfer the information internally? 
3. AML Risk Assessment - Who is in charge of auditing the AML Risk 
Assessment? 
- We already discussed this topic, but can you confirm 
again with me the risk criteria of the company? 
- What is the basis of your risk rating? 
- What is the rationale behind dividing the customer into 
CDD & EDD? 
4. Continuous Monitoring 
& Suspicious 
Transaction Activity 
- Who is responsible for monitoring the transactions? 
- To whom do you report if there is suspicious 
transaction? What happens afterwards? 
- How do you detect suspicious activities? 
- How do you guarantee up-to-date database? 
- What kind of technological tool do you use for 
blockchain analytics? 
 
